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Abstract
This paper assesses the policy consensus that exists amongst political parties in the UK
in their shared ambition to eradicate child poverty by 2020. Three major pillars of policy –
work intensification, re-distribution and skill upgrading – are challenged in terms of their likely
success in reducing child poverty. In particular, the assumption that upgrading skills will raise
earnings is challenged by examining the changing patterns of work in a selection of developed
economies since the 1970s. This paper argues that addressing relative poverty requires an
alternative theoretical approach to the neoclassical economics that currently underpins policy.
Different national levels of earnings dispersion suggest that the role of institutions and culture
in determining market outcomes deserves at least as much attention as the supply of skills.
Introduction
The main political parties in the UK share the social policy objective, enshrined
in law, to eradicate child poverty by 2020.1 Three measures by which to judge
this target have been adopted: a household measure of absolute low income, a
measure of relative low income and a measure that combines material deprivation
and relative low income (DWP, 2003: 9; Child Poverty Unit, 2009).2 The main
parties also agree on three broad ‘pillars’ of policy to achieve the reduction in
child poverty (Harker, 2007; Liberal Democrats, 2007, 2009; Cameron, 2008;
Conservative Party, 2008a, 2008b):
(i) ‘Work intensification’ includes welfare to work programmes, an ongoing
programme of welfare reforms and initiatives to get the economically
inactive from poor households into work (DWP, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).
(ii) ‘Re-distribution’ includes the national minimum wage, working family
and child tax credits, increases in child benefit and allowances targeted at
young children in families claiming income support (DWP, 2005, 2006).
(iii) ‘Skill upgrading’ includes universal and income targeted early years
programmes, increased spending and changes in the administration of
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formal education and evolving programmes of changes to vocational
training for young people and the unemployed (DES, 2007; DWP and
DIUS, 2008).
Disagreement has been over issues of implementation, the relative role of public
and private sector in delivery and the specific targeting of spending, rather
than over the appropriateness of these policy pillars (Liberal Democrats, 2007;
Conservative Party, 2008a, 2008b).
This agreement over a key social objective and the policy pillars to achieve it
is surprising given that we might expect differing political philosophies between
parties. Under examination, it becomes clear that tensions exist between the
social objective and policy pillars that reflect unresolved tensions in the political
philosophies of each party. The policy pillars of (i) work intensification and
(iii) skill upgrading are consistent with a belief in market outcomes and a
political philosophy of providing equality of opportunity for citizens to negotiate
those markets (Cameron, 2005; Gamble, 2005; Finlayson, 2009: 5–9). Equality of
opportunity is a procedural aspiration and hence the distributional consequences
that result are explicitly outside the control of government. Income inequality may
be high or low (see Blair, 2002; Coates, 2005: 59; Levitas, 2005: 133–5), as may be
the resulting levels of relative household and child poverty. This is one reason
why the New Labour project was accused by some as representing merely an
extension of the neoliberal project of its Conservative predecessors (Hay, 1999;
Heffernan, 2000; Callanicos, 2001). In contrast, the social objective of reducing
the incidence of child poverty – a distributional outcome – is inconsistent with
a political philosophy limited to delivering equality of opportunity. So too is the
second policy pillar of redistribution.3
The question is why all the main political parties share this uneasy
compromise between outcome and procedural objectives, policies of negotiating
labour markets and policies that interfere with market outcomes. A possible
answer is that we have reached a politics of post-ideological pragmatism (see
Larsen et al., 2006; Page, 2007: 27). A neoclassical understanding of the operation
and benefits of markets dominates (Jordan, 2008: 55–8), tempered by a concern
for the working poor (Jordan and Duevell, 2003: 135–6), and recognition of
previous governments’ failure to equip citizens to effectively negotiate those
markets (Dolowitz, 2004: 221–2).
There is no straightforward intellectual resolution to the tensions identified;
however, it is clear that neoclassical economics dominates political thinking. The
major political parties share the view that markets are best left to reach their
own naturally determined price levels. Direct government intervention and the
operation of power by block interests, such as trade unions and monopolistic
companies, are to be avoided. Labour markets and product markets should be
flexible in terms of prices and quantities of work provided (OECD, 1994; Lewis,
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2009). The legitimate role of government is twofold: first, to ensure that the
welfare system encourages physically able working-age adults into the labour
market (policy pillar (i)); and, second, that skills are at a level to enable the
economy to compete in global markets and continue to grow (policy pillar (iii)).
Policy pillar (ii), redistribution, can only ever ameliorate the inexorable logic of
the market-determined price system of wages, and is partially rectifying failures,
past and present, in policy pillar (iii).
Government gets its intellectual mandate to interfere in skill determination,
rather than leaving it to individuals operating within the market, from ‘post-
neoclassical endogenous growth theory’ (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). This theory
was originally transmitted to New Labour from the Clinton administration’s
advisors (Dolowitz, 2004; Coates, 2005: 34). The crucial elements of the theory
are that economic growth is related to a society’s knowledge and human capital
(Coates, 1999: 79–80), and that there will likely be a private underinvestment in
human capital because the benefits of knowledge spill outside of any investing
firm (Romer, 1986: 1003). Hence, it is in society’s interest for government to invest
in human capital or, in more straightforward language, skills in order to improve
its knowledge base.
From the perspective of individuals, human capital theory suggests that
greater human capital results in higher levels of marginal productivity, which
equate with higher wages/total remuneration to labour. Hence, there is a
potential social benefit in terms of narrowing the earnings distribution, as well
as a macroeconomic benefit in terms of increased growth, in increasing the
human capital of the lowest-paid workers in society. Creating a ‘knowledge
economy’ holds the long-run promise of solving economic and social problems
simultaneously (Brown et al., 2001: 9, 13).4
This paper challenges the ability of this theoretical understanding of labour
markets to capture their actual operation in real economies, and hence the
capacity for policies that rest upon it to achieve their desired objectives. It does
so primarily through an empirical assessment of the three policy pillars’ ability
to achieve reductions in relative household and hence child poverty.
Pillars (i) and (ii), work intensification and re-distribution, are examined
together because the capacity for an increased quantity of paid work to lift families
above the relative poverty line depends upon the degree of redistribution. It is
found that, for low-paid workers, increasing the quantity of paid work performed
by a household, given current levels of redistribution, is extremely limited in
lifting those families out of poverty. This suggests that policy pillar (iii), upskilling,
is central to the social objective of eradicating child poverty by 2020.
Raising skills and creating a knowledge economy are ‘supply-side’ policies.
They rely upon demand for skills by employers increasing in line with their
increased supply. However, the evidence from employment across a number of
developed economies shows polarised growth in high- and low-paid work, with
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the middle of the distribution becoming ‘hollowed out’. This trend suggests that
developed countries will have to manage the assimilation of an increasing number
of households consisting of workers that perform low-paid work currently
categorised as low-skilled.
Possible responses to this challenge vary in their degree of radicalism;
however, this paper argues that we need to examine more closely a generally
overlooked part of the picture – the factors that determine national wage
structures. By showing that the degree of national wage dispersion differs
considerably between developed countries, it argues that this cannot be explained
by neoclassical economic theory and requires research into national institutional
and cultural causes. Only through such research may issues of relative household
and child poverty be effectively addressed.
Examining the effectiveness of policy pillars (i) and (ii) work
intensification and redistribution in reducing child poverty
(i) Policy overview
The main mechanism on which the government has focused to reduce the
incidence of childhood poverty since 1998/9 has been getting parents into work.
nearly half of children in low income live in households where no adult works. . .finding work is
the first step out of poverty – changes in labour-market earnings account for roughly two-thirds
of exits from low income (DWP, 2006: 19).
This aspiration has crystallised into a long-term target for an employment rate
of 80 per cent of the working age population and a 70 per cent employment rate
for lone parents (DWP, 2005: 4, 36).
The government has phased in increasingly tough welfare reforms in its
attempt to increase employment. The New Deal created an obligation for those
on unemployment benefits – job seekers allowance (JSA) – for more than six
months to address their skills and subsequently engage in paid, subsidised or
voluntary work, or recognised training.5 The second phase of reform promoted
voluntary participation in further targeted New Deals and ‘Pathways to Work’
directed at the disabled, lone parents and partners of JSA claimants. The
ongoing third phase represents a toughening of the approach towards long-term
benefit claimants (Black, 2008) through rationalisation of the benefits system,
‘personalised conditionality’ (Gregg, 2008: 11) and the involvement of the private
sector in employment matching alongside enhanced roles for Job Centres (Freud,
2007: 4–6; DWP, 2008a).
Alongside the increases in the number of people working have been policies
aimed at improving the income of the lowest paid. The national minimum wage
was introduced on 1April 1999with annual reviews produced by the independent
Low Pay Commission on its recommended level. The working families tax credit
was also introduced in 1999, split in April 2003 into child tax credit and working
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tax credit. Working and child tax credits provide income-related payments up to
household earnings of £18,215 for childless households6 and £58,231 for those with
children, although for a two-child family with annual income above £29,677, the
maximum value of tax credits is £545 per annum.7
Additional financial incentives are aimed at intensifying both the number of
workers in low-income households and the quantity of work that they perform
(DWP, 2007: 19–24). For example childcare tax credits are conditional upon each
adult working a minimum of 16 hours per week, and one of the working tax
credits is conditional upon the household working a minimum of 30 hours per
week (HMRC, 2010).
(ii) Assessment of performance
The government has certainly achieved some success through these policy
measures. The employment rate for lone parents stood at 56.7 per cent in 2009, up
12.1 per cent from 44.6 per cent in 1997, when Labour came to power (ONS, 2010).
The employment rate for the working-age population increased from 72.8 per
cent in May 1997 to stabilise at between 74.5 per cent and 75 per cent for much of
the 2000s prior to the effects of the financial crisis, after which it dropped to 72.4
per cent for the last released monthly figure of November 2009 (ONS, 2010). The
government narrowly missed its interim target in 2004/5 to reduce child poverty
by 25 per cent from a 1998/99 baseline, achieving a 21.3 per cent reduction before
housing costs (BHC) and a 17.2 per cent reduction after housing costs (AHC)
(Brewer et al., 2006: 35).8 Since then the situation has worsened. Between 2004–5
and 2007–8, the last year for which data are available from the ‘Family Resources
Survey’ (DWP, 2009), there has been a recorded increase of 200,000 children in
poverty (BHC) and 300,000 (AHC) (Brewer et al., 2009: 30, 43–4, table 4.4). This
left the government needing to reduce child poverty by an additional 1.2 million
children (BHC) to reach its target for 2010–11. To put this in context, it reduced
it by 500,000 between 1998–9 and 2007–8.
As of 2007–8, the two largest shares of total household income in Britain
were earnings (66 per cent), and benefits and tax credits (18 per cent) (Brewer
et al., 2009: 13, table 2.3).9 Whilst a minority factor when considering the whole
population, benefits and tax credits are highly significant in determining whether
low-income households are above the relative poverty threshold. Between 1997
and 2001 increases in employment for poor households contributed significantly
to the reduction in child poverty. However, between 2001 and 2005, most of the
fall in child poverty is attributable to increases in tax credits (Brewer et al., 2006).
The increase in child poverty since then has been at a time when the growth
in entitlements has been less than the growth of the relative poverty line or the
retail price index (RPI), that is a reduction in income in real terms (Brewer
et al., 2009: 37, table 4.3). A recent estimate of the additional spending on
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TABLE 1. – Breakdown of child poverty by family type (2007–8)
% of children categorised
Family type by working status of parents in poverty
Lone Parent Full-time 2.3
Part-time 6.3
Non-working 29.6
Couple Self-employed 12.5
Two full-time earners 1.2
One full-time, one part-time 3.7
One full-time, one not working 14.5
One or both part-time 10.9
Neither adult working 19.1
Total (as a percent of all children) 100 (22.5)
Source: Author calculations using ‘Family Resources Survey 2007–8’. There will
be some rounding errors as the original table from which this is derived displays
percentages to only 1 decimal point.
redistribution required to meet the 2010–11 and 2020 targets is £4bn per annum.
Given the current strains on public finances, this is not a realistic option.
Given this fiscal constraint, all the major parties are committed to further
welfare reforms to get the economically inactive into work. From Table 1, it is
clear that the greatest risk of a child being in poverty comes from them being in
a non-working family (48.7 per cent of all children in poverty) and that the risk
is very low if parents work full-time or at least where one parent works full-time
and the other part-time (only 7.2 per cent of all children in poverty live in such
households).10 Given these data, it is perhaps not surprising that policy-makers
have concluded that having both parents working, preferably full-time, should
reduce the incidence of child poverty.
However, there is a potential fallacy of composition here. If families currently
engaged in full-time work have relatively high incomes due to the quality of
work that they perform rather than its quantity,11 then dramatically increasing
the quantity of paid work for many other families will not have the desired
result. Examining the distribution of working adults by standard occupational
classification supports this intuition. Employment is skewed towards higher-level
occupations – managers, professional and associate professional occupations –
for families where all adults work full-time. There is a statistically significant
dependence of occupational classification upon family type which is most
pronounced when comparing full-time working families with families where
one or both adults work part-time.12 Part-time working families consist of
workers concentrated in elementary occupations, personal services and sales and
customer services (see Figure 1). People entering the labour market from long-
term inactivity are more likely to obtain this quality of work than that performed
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Figure 1. Comparison of employment by occupation for families where all adults work full-time
and those who work part-time
Source: ‘Family Resources Survey 2007–8’ (DWP, 2009)
N = 2,658 working adults for families where all adults work full-time and 993 working adults
in families that do not contain a full-time worker.
Percentages sum to 100within each family type across all Standard Occupational Classifications.
The occupational category ‘undefined’ has been removed from the calculations as it may include
adults in part-time working families who do not work.
by the small proportion of families, only 12.9 per cent of the population of all
households with children, where all adults work full-time.
A further limiting factor, that continues to be an obstacle in the desire for
all parents to work full-time, is the prohibitive cost and availability of childcare.
This is something that the Labour government was trying to address through
the direct provision of free childcare. There is a target of 15 hours per week free
childcare for all three- and four-year olds, an increased network of 3,500 Sure Start
childcare centres and childcare between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., organised through
schools for all five to 14 year olds during term time (DWP, 2007: 29; DES, 2007).
In addition, working tax credit includes a component that contributes to up to
80 per cent of childcare costs, up to a limit of £175 per week for one child or £300
for two children, in households where both parents work more than 16 hours per
week (HMRC, 2010). However, it remains to be seen whether these targets will
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be supported by the new government and, if they are, whether they will radically
alter the problems that families face in juggling work and caring responsibilities.
As most of the people that the government wishes to move into employment
will have limited labour market skills or experience, it is informative to examine
the capacity for a greater quantity of low-paid work to lift the poorest households
out of poverty. I have estimated the net disposable income including tax credits
that would be paid to a two-adult, two-child family working for the minimum
wage, where the adults work different proportions of time and pay for childcare
in proportion to this (see Appendix for details of the calculation). The results are
shown in Table 2.
This analysis indicates that all of the families would be below the ‘equivalised’
60 per cent median net household income poverty line (BHC) of £18,772 (author
calculation from Adams et al., 2009: 18, table 2.3) for two-adult, two-children
families if it were not for tax credits. Tax credits make a major contribution in
lifting families with two full-time workers above this threshold. Whether the
other working configurations for families are lifted above the threshold depends
upon the extent to which they consume childcare, which highlights the issue of
what is included in the measure of net disposable income.
The measure followed in the DWP constructed ‘Households Below Average
Income’ HBAI tables deducts costs such as council tax, occupational pension
contributions and student loan repayments, and provides both before and after
housing costs measures (BHC and AHC) (see Adams et al., 2009: 2–3, 175–6).
Given this sensitivity, it is surprising that income is not calculated both gross
and net of childcare costs. As Table 2 indicates, a large element of tax credits
for low-earning families with pre-school children can be towards childcare costs,
paid as a transfer. Taken at face value, these transfers dramatically increase net
disposable income as a percentage of median income (see Table 2).13 However,
this transfer, whilst generous, only pays up to 80 per cent of actual childcare
costs. Therefore, if net disposable income is calculated after childcare costs, it is
significantly lower (the second to last row of Table 2).
When making the comparison with median net household earnings, ideally
this should also be adjusted for the quantity of paid childcare that the median
family consumes. Unfortunately, this is not known. However, because of the
tapering effect of increased income-reducing tax credits, I consider it highly
unlikely that the median household can afford to employ full-time childcare.
Therefore, a second-best comparison for poverty purposes is post-childcare
disposable income as a percentage of median net household income (last row
of Table 2). This will be most stable over the lifetime of the children, with the
quantity of childcare required decreasing as children reach school age.
Whether one uses the disposable income measure net of childcare costs or
not, the conclusions are similar. Two full-time working parents definitively get
over60per cent of medium income with children of pre-school or school age. One
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TABLE 2. Estimates of net disposable income of households working for the minimum wage, as a proportion of median income,
tax year 2008–9a
One two-year old child, one school aged child under 14 Two school aged children under 14
Two FT One FT, one Two HT One FT Two FT One FT, one Two HT One FT
workers, HT worker, workers, one worker, workers, no HT worker, workers, no worker, no
one child in one child in child in PT partner unpaid paid no paid paid paid
FT daycare PT daycare daycare childcare childcare childcare childcare childcare
Gross earnings 20,628 15,471 10,314 10,314 20,628 15,471 10,314 10,314
Net earningsb 16,933 13,166 9,399 8,009 16,933 13,166 9,399 8,009
Working tax credit 0 995 3,006 3,006 0 995 3,006 3,006
Childcare tax credit 4,744c 3,840d 2,400e 0 0 0 0 0
Child tax credit 5,015 5,015 5,015 5,015 3,999 5,015 5,015 5,015
Net disposable income 26,692 23,016 19,820 16,030 20,932 19,176 17,420 16,030
% median income 85 74 63 51 67 61 56 51
Net disposable income – 19,492 18,216 16,940 16,030 20,932 19,176 17,420 16,030
childcare costsf
% median income 63 58 54 51 67 61 56 51
Notes: aValues are expressed in GBP unless percentages of median income.
bNet earnings are after income tax, national insurance and council tax.
cBased on £150 per week childcare costs over 48 weeks, which is £25 less than the maximum that the government will provide funding towards.
dBased on £100 per week childcare costs over 48 weeks as it is assumed that childcare costs will not simply halve with part-time work.
eBased on £50 per week childcare costs over 48 weeks as it is assumed that two part-time workers can flex childcare more easilly than one part-time.
fNet disposable income minus the childcare working tax credit and the non-government funded 20% of childcare costs.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 11 Jul 2014 IP address: 147.188.224.215
544 paul lewis
full-time and one half-time working parent also manage this if the children are
at school, but it is borderline if one child is of pre-school age after childcare costs
have been accounted for. Neither one full-time parent nor two half-time working
parents manage it. Net of childcare costs, not even two full-time working parents
on the minimum wage are able to pass 70 per cent of median household income,
the level used in the combined measure of child poverty. These calculations are
without any further pulling away of the median earning household from those
towards the bottom in future years.
This analysis indicates that for those earning low wages, even with the current
levels of tax credits, increasing the intensity of work in families is extremely
limited in raising those families out of poverty. This is consistent with the general
observations that many service jobs, particularly those related to social care, do
not pay enough to meet the high costs of living and raising a family in the UK or
US, and that family members are required to increase participation in the labour
market in an attempt to maintain living standards (Jordan and Duevell, 2003:
102, 132). It follows that the skills component of the government’s strategy will be
heavily relied upon to raise the earnings of the lowest paid relative to those above
them. The issue is going to be the quality of work that is available and the pay
that may be earned from it. It is this that the skills agenda, with its supply-side
focus, is intended to address and it is to these trends that I now turn.
Examining the effectiveness of policy pillar (iii) skill upgrading in
reducing child poverty
(i) Policy overview
Consistent with the economic theory described in the introduction,
enhanced skills have been linked to productivity, economic competitiveness,
increased personal income and a reduction in ‘social deprivation, poverty
and inequality’ (Leitch, 2006: 4; DWP and DIUS, 2008). Top quartile performance
in each level of skills is targeted by 2020, which would place the UK eighth in
international rankings. Benefits are estimated to be in the order of £80bn of
current value over the next 30 years, based upon productivity and employment
growth of 10 per cent by 2020 (Leitch, 2006: 15).
Considering one of the tasks of the Leitch report was to identify the skills
that would be required in the UK in the future (Leitch, 2006: 143), there is a
lot of emphasis on skills needing to be ‘economically valuable’, but virtually
no identification of the actual skills that individuals will need. Leitch explicitly
rejects what he calls the historical ‘supply-side’ attempts to predict future skill
requirements. Instead, he calls for a ‘demand-led’ process, which means greater
employer involvement in the determination of qualifications and more of a
market in training. The market will operate both in terms of greater employer
control of budgets in commissioning workplace training, referred to as ‘train
to gain’, and individual control of ‘learner accounts’ in spending personal
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allowances on training.14 There will also be a national employer-led Commission
for Employment and Skills, responsible for ‘re-licensed and re-empowered’ sector
skills councils, which in turn are tasked with ‘taking the lead role in developing
occupational standards and approving vocational qualifications’ (Leitch, 2006:
18; DWP and DIUS, 2008).
The tension between societal and personal benefit within the theory of
human capital theory is apparent when it comes to who should be responsible
for paying for training. The Leitch report suggests that the government should
be responsible for the bulk of basic training (up to level 2, equivalent to five good
GCSEs), employers and individuals should contribute at least 50 per cent of level
3 training costs (equivalent to two A-levels), whilst the bulk of level 4 (degree
level) training should be paid for by recipients as ‘they will benefit most’ (Leitch,
2006: 15).
(ii) Assessing likely performance
As mentioned, the idea that skill upgrading will result in poverty reduction
rests upon human capital theory, which is an extension of the marginal
productivity theory of neoclassical economics. In equilibrium, skilled workers
are employed until their marginal product exactly equals their marginal cost
(remuneration). This theory considers the labour market as a trading floor for
the pre-existing possession of skills, general or specific, that have productive use
to employers.
Implicit in the theory is the assumption that investment in human capital
will create its own demand (Brown et al., 2001: 17). In other words, the nature of
jobs will change in order to make use of enhanced skills, otherwise the capacity for
skills to be translated into actual productivity will be limited by the work that is
available. Criticisms of this assumption highlight regional disparities in demand
(Theodore, 2007), including the importance of transport proximity to London
(Dorling, 2006), and more fundamentally the socially embedded nature of work
(Block, 1990: 75) with the existence of multiple segmented labour markets rather
than a simple skill–reward relationship (see Fine, 1998: 124–32 for a historical
overview). However, the skill–reward equilibrium assumed by human capital
theory has not been a problem from the economist’s perspective. As stated above,
technological change was seen as ensuring higher-skilled workers would have
higher-skilled jobs.
The theory of ‘skill-biased technical change’ (SBTC) suggests that new
technology – particularly computers – requires highly skilled workers to be able to
operate it and simultaneously makes low-skilled workers redundant (e.g. Machin,
2001: 774). To a lesser extent, trade with developing countries that specialise in the
production of low-skilled labour-intensive goods reduces the demand for low-
skilled labour in developed countries. This should mean an observed reduction
in the number of workers employed in low-skilled occupations and an increase
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in employment in high-skilled ones. The limiting factor, which also explains the
increasing wage dispersion between the 1970s and 1990s, was thought to be the
scarcity of skilled workers. The conclusion drawn was to upskill the workforce in
developed countries, reducing the supply bottleneck, and shifting the majority
of work to the new high-productivity, high-wage jobs.
Recent evidence has begun to challenge this view, even if the theory has
always been considered extremely reductionist by other social sciences. The
crucial evidence is with regard to the changing structure of employment within
developed countries. Empirical studies of the UK, US and Germany using detailed
occupational-industry classifications have found that, whilst employment in the
top two deciles of jobs has increased dramatically since the 1970s, it has also
unexpectedly increased in the lowest two deciles.15 Jobs in the middle six deciles
of the distribution have been disappearing. This suggests polarisation in the
workforce, with an increasing proportion of low-paid workers and an increasing
proportion of high-paid workers (Autor et al., 2006; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Goos
and Manning, 2007; Dustman et al., 2009).
SBTC predicted the increase in high-skilled jobs but not in low-skilled ones.
In response, a more nuanced version of the technology hypothesis has been put
forward, attributed to Autor, Levy and Murnane (ALM) (2003). This suggests
that computer technology is a replacement for workers performing routine tasks,
mainly clerical and skilled manual roles in the middle of the wage distribution,
but cannot replace those workers doing non-routine tasks, either professional or
managerial at the top, or low-paying service occupations at the bottom.
Whilst able to potentially explain rising wages for the high-skilled as an
increase in demand above the supply of skilled workers, even the ALM hypothesis
struggles to explain falling relative wages for the low-skilled under circumstances
of increasing demand and reduced supply. (This reduced supply is the logical
consequence of an increasingly educated workforce.) It could well be that
immigration from poorer countries has played a major role in boosting the
supply of workers willing to perform low-skilled roles. However, this does not
mean that such workers are receiving the theoretical equilibrium wage for their
skills, as many are vastly overqualified for the work.
The fact is that the content of jobs limits the potential productivity of
any worker and cannot be overcome by improving the qualifications of those
applying for them. In examining the UK, Goos and Manning found an increase
in the average level of qualifications across all occupations and an increase in
the entry-level qualifications being asked for.16 However, they also found little
change in the skills required to perform the jobs and survey results reported
that workers in low-skilled jobs feel unnecessarily skilled to perform them. This
suggests that a form of ‘credentialism’ has been occurring, where employers will
take the highest qualified workers available, even if their skills are in excess of
those required (Goos and Manning, 2007: 128–9).
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Neither the changing structure of jobs nor the widening dispersion
in compensation between low- and high-skilled workers fits well with the
neoclassical framework of human capital theory and theories of skill-biased
technological change that suggest we may aspire to a knowledge economy. The
idea that upskilling the workforce will automatically upskill the work and result
in a narrowing of wages is unrealistic for real economies. The similar patterns
of employment growth across countries adds a considerable note of caution to
claims made in the influential ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature that developed
countries can specialise in productive activities best suited to their ‘institutional
basis of comparative advantage’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Whilst it is true that
the percentage of employment by industry differs across countries, suggesting
some opportunity for strategic industrial policy, none of the developed countries
examined has been able to escape significant growth in low-skilled service
employment (Drucker, 1993: 7; see GGDC, 2008). No amount of aspiring to
the knowledge economy is going to change this.
With hindsight, it is now clear that the Anglophone economies used credit
as a ‘privatised Keynesian’ substitute for the earnings of the low-paid from the
1990s onwards (Crouch, 2008; Jordan, 2008: 249). However, as has been found to
our cost, this is not a sustainable solution to low earnings, limited ultimately by
the ability to repay debt out of income.
A radical response that has been suggested is for a universal basic income
(Van Parijs, 1995). This accepts the increase in low-skilled work, takes market
determined remuneration as a given and considers what states can do to ensure
the material well-being of workers that perform such jobs. Some claim it would
make low-productivity and part-time jobs more attractive and to be freely chosen
irrespective of their economic valuation (Barry, 1997, cited in Jordan, 2008: 225–
6). It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the arguments for a universal
basic income. However, before taking such a radical step, it is important to
examine whether the market valuations of work are as objective and universal as
assumed by economic theory and policy-makers.
Whilst economic theory suggests a universal logic of marginal product and
marginal cost equating to produce levels of remuneration, as will be seen in
the next section there are large cross-country differences in ‘market’ determined
earnings dispersion. Which factors determine the size of earnings differentials
between types of jobs and whether governments have any capability to alter this
are important questions that have been largely unexamined in considering how to
address rising earnings inequality and relative poverty in developed economies.
Different national degrees of earnings dispersion
A range of evidence exists that illustrates national differences in the
distribution of earnings within similarly developed economies. A direct way
to measure this is to compare points in the earnings distribution. Table 3 shows
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TABLE 3. Decile earning ratios 1984 and 2005
1984 2005
d90/d10 d90/d50 d50/d10 d90/d10 d90/d50 d50/d10
UK 3.2 1.8 1.8 3.6 2.0 1.8
US 4.1 2.1 2.0 4.9 2.3 2.1
France 3.1 1.9 1.6 2.9 2.0 1.5
Germany 2.9 1.7 1.7 3.3 1.7 1.9
Source: OECD (2009).
TABLE 4. The proportion of all employees categorised as
low-paid in a selection of developed countries, 2005
US UK Germany Netherlands France Denmark
25 22.1 20.8 17.6 12.7 8.5
Source: Solow (2008: 6)
the ratio of earnings between the 90th, 50th and 10th percentiles for several
countries in 1984 and 2005.
The US is the most unequal for all ratios in both years, with the top earners
having particularly pulled away from the bottom and to a lesser extent from
the middle during the period. The UK demonstrates a similar trend, with the
government policies reviewed in this paper credited with preventing the lowest
earners from falling further behind the rest (Mason et al., 2008: 15).
Germany began the period with some of the lowest ratios but was regressive
for the lowest paid. This has led to German service sector trade unions initiating
a campaign for a minimum wage of about 50 per cent of the full-time median in
2006 (Bosch and Weinkopf, 2008: 308). France bucks the trend, with the lowest
earners having increased their wage relative to middle and top earners, whilst the
middle has slightly lost ground to the top.
The country decile ratios are consistent with the proportion of workers
categorised as low-paid, defined as gross hourly pay below 60 per cent of the
median hourly wage for all employees (see Table 4).
Being a low-earner does not automatically translate into living in a poor
household, because of the potential for there to be multiple earners (Mason
et al., 2008: 29–30). However, the UK’s relatively high proportion of low-paid
workers reinforces the argument made earlier that intensifying the quantity of
work performed by poor households will be extremely limited in shifting these
households above the relative poverty line. The data also highlight the degree
to which different countries produce dramatically different outcomes when it
comes to low pay for the same work.
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TABLE 5. Spread of average industry compensation
as a proportion of the employment weighted mean
wage across all industries
2005 UK US France Germany
Lowest 0.29 0.38 0.60 0.47
Highest 1.95 1.85 1.71 1.75
Stand. Dev. 0.43 0.45 0.29 0.40
Source: Author calculations using the highest level ISIC
categories (12) from the EU KLEMS database (GGDC, 2008)
A further piece of evidence is a comparison of the range and standard
deviation of industry compensation across countries, using data categorised by
Standard Industry Codes (see Table 5)
Whilst Table 5 provides a fairly crude measure of earnings dispersion, using
average compensation across industry categories that in some cases group several
occupations, it is consistent with the previous two tables. Greater dispersion
in average employee compensation between industries is consistent with an
increased incidence of relatively low-paid workers.
Given the similar trends experienced by the four countries examined in the
growth of low-skilled, relatively low-paid work, what is significant for the social
objective of reducing relative poverty through increased work intensification is
the gap between the wages of these workers and the rest of the workforce.
Human capital theory can only explain the cross-country differences in
wage dispersion in terms of national distributions of skills. This is ‘a universal,
irrefutable, empty rationalization for existing wage differentials’ (Galbraith, 2001:
8). Even if different countries have different educational distributions, such an
explanation suggests that the same occupation in the same industry but in
different developed countries has widely different skill requirements and resulting
marginal products. In particular, it suggests that professional and managerial
occupations in finance and business services in the UK and US are much more
skilled and inherently productive than their counterparts in continental Europe,
whilst many retail, health and personal service workers are much more skilled
and productive in Germany and France than the UK and US. As Martin Carnoy
puts it, ‘the pay off to education is conditioned not only by technology, but by
information, ideology, political power, property rights, citizenship rights in the
workplace, and the willingness of organizations to innovate constantly’ (1995: 3).
It is impossible to roll all of these considerations into a single concept of human
capital (Fine, 1998: 60).
For economists to consider how other features of societies affect wage
determination means considering the labour market to be ‘non-competitive’. In
other words, wages do not solely reflect the marginal productivity contribution of
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the factor inputs, and hence firms do not optimise their production to maximise
consumer utility for the inputs available. To state this is an almost heretical
step, but even so a number of labour market economists have at least raised the
possibility that ‘differences in labour market and educational institutions may
greatly affect how demand shifts translate into wage structure changes’ (Autor
et al., 2006: 6–7; see also Goos and Manning, 2007: 132; Dustman et al., 2009: 874).
It is not possible in this paper to examine the range of cultural and
institutional factors specific to national economies that may result in dramatically
different wage distributions; however, some suggestions for further research can
be made. Although the analysis of earnings is gross, prior to tax, redistribution
and the provision of welfare services, it may be suggested that the private–public
mix in employment will have an effect on relative wage levels for certain services,
particulary those related to social care (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Iversen and
Wren, 1998).17 Whilst this may be true, it is insufficient to explain significant
cross-country differences in average industry wage dispersion found across a
wide range of private and public sector industries (GGDC, 2008). A broader
argument may be made that the national institutions of the ‘production regime’
– the financial, education and training, industrial relations and inter-company
competition systems – found in the varieties of capitalism and business systems
interact to produce significant differences in cross-country wage dispersion
(see Lewis, 2009: ch. 7). A culturally sensitive addition to this argument is
that there is a social code of pay norms, distinct from the economic theory
of workers being paid their marginal product, that is contingent. Changes to
greater inequality of earnings are related to ‘superstar rents’, steeper hierarchies
of pay in organisations and shifts from hierarchical to individualised norms of pay
(Atkinson, 2008: 72–9).
Whatever the combination of causes, the last two sections have demonstrated
that significant differences in national wage structures exist, whilst differences
in the structure of employment across national economies are not as significant
as the Hall and Soskice inspired literature suggests. These distinct national wage
structures cannot be plausibly explained by the neoclassical understanding of
the economy that dominates politics and policy in the UK today. Understanding
the causes of national wage dispersion from a broader cultural and institutional
perspective is central to policy aspirations to reduce relative household and child
poverty.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the main political parties in the UK share
the social objective of reducing relative poverty through the implementation of
three broad policy pillars. It has argued that, whilst not entirely coherent, these
policy pillars are consistent with a neoclassical understanding of how the economy
should optimally function. The unencumbered operation of competitive markets
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combined with ‘new growth theory’ holds the promise of improved economic
performance and the narrowing of earnings inequality. It also provides a mandate
for government to intervene on the supply-side of the economy in increasing
participation in paid work and enhancing societal knowledge and the skills or
‘human capital’ of citizens.
However, this paper is sceptical of the economic framework as a model of real
economies and hence the effectiveness of social policies related to it to achieve a
reduction in relative household poverty. It empirically demonstrates the serious
limitations of work intensification for poor households, given current levels of
redistributive intervention, to lift such households above the relative poverty line.
This leaves much of the burden of reducing child poverty upon the policy pillar
of enhanced skills moving us towards a knowledge-based economy.
The examination of employment trends in a selection of developed
economies suggests that, contrary to theory, upskilling the workers does not
automatically upskill the work. There has been a polarisation of employment
growth in both low-skilled, low-paid work and high-skilled, high-paid work. This
is at the same time that educational qualifications in the UK have been improving
across the workforce. When combined with the long-run technological trend for
manufacturing to shed labour, this suggests that all developed economies will
have to contend with an increasing proportion of service workers that have
traditionally been categorised as low-skilled. Pursuing the mythical knowledge
economy is not a realistic option.
However, it is striking that different countries produce dramatically different
earnings dispersion across the same jobs, resulting in different proportions of
the workforce being categorised as low-paid. This is difficult to explain with
the standard ‘competitive theory’ unless skill differentials between the same
occupations and industries are dramatically different in different countries. Even
some neoclassical economists are suggesting that we need to look to wider societal
factors to understand earnings dispersion. Without the possibility of increasing
redistribution, which is highly unlikely given the dire fiscal consequences of
the financial crisis and limited political appetite, relative poverty may only be
realistically addressed through a comprehensive examination of how institutional
and cultural factors influence the ‘market’ distribution of earnings.
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Notes
1 The Child Poverty Bill, which enshrines the 2020 target in law, gained Royal Assent on 25
March 2010. ‘Eradication’ is not literal and is taken to be an incidence between 5 per cent
and 10 per cent of all children, depending upon the specific measure.
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2 The absolute measure is a baseline of the relative measure from a particular year in today’s
prices. The relative measure is the agreed European Union definition of ‘those people living
in a household with an income below 60 per cent of contemporary median’. The combined
measure includes both material deprivation and a higher relative measure of 70 per cent
of median income (DWP, 2003: 7–9). The relative income measure is most tracked by
commentators and was adopted for the 2004–5 target.
3 Whilst the policy pillar of redistribution exposes limited ideological differences between
parties, all have been reticent to explicitly favour cuts in redistributive policies.
4 There is a tension between the role of state and individual in who should invest in human
capital as both potentially benefit. This is played out in the level of skills training that
the government is prepared to fund, with tertiary education increasingly seen as the
responsibility of the individual (see Fine, 1998, for analysis of the individualistic theory
of human capital theory).
5 Initially, the New Deal targeted 18–24 year olds, but was gradually rolled out to include all
claimants under 60 years old.
6 Author calculation based on the tapering of 2009–10 working tax credit allowances for
two-adult households working more than 30 hours per week.
7 Author calculation based on a two-adult, two-child family working more than 30 hours per
week, not claiming any childcare in 2009–10.
8 These figures were calculated using non-rounded data, government reporting in the
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) tables (Adams et al., 2009) and the ‘Family
Resources Survey’ (DWP, 2009) rounded to the nearest 100,000. These differences were
statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level.
9 The remainder includes income from self-employment, savings investments and private
pensions, and other income.
10 The legal definition that the government adopted for full-time and part-time work depends
upon the type of contract that the worker has with regard to the custom and practice of
the employer. There is no universal rule such as hours worked that may be applied (HM
Government UK, 2000).
11 The term ‘quality’ is being used to reflect the ordinal rankings of the standard occupational
classification of work, which also has a relationship to market remuneration, rather than a
normative judgement of the value of any activity to society or the individual performing it.
12 The Pearson chi square test indicates a statistically significant dependence at the 99 per cent
level between the standard occupational classification and the economic status of the family.
Economic status is a categorisation that indicates the composition of full- and part-time
work in each family, e.g. all full-time, one full-time one part-time, etc. The test is significant
whether all family types are compared simultaneously or each family type is compared
independently with the family type that contains full-time working adults.
13 The economic case for minimum-wage workers to substitute unpaid childcare at home for
paid childcare where other workers need to be paid the minimum wage plus overheads and
profit does not add up. It requires a large subsidy from government, which may only be
justified on the basis that this is acting to prevent longer-term dependency on benefits as
children grow up.
14 All young people aged 18–25 who do not go to university are to be entitled to training up
to level 3, the equivalent of two A-levels, delivered either at work, through a local college
or other training provider. The government estimates this to be worth up to £7,000 for
someone with no qualifications. There is a voluntary ‘skills pledge’ which employers can
opt into for government-funded training for staff up to level 2, five good GCSEs equivalent.
Workplace ‘train-to-gain’ funding to employers is to be £1bn by 2010–11 (Leitch, 2006: 12,
17–19, ch.4; DWP and DIUS, 2008: 7–8, 22)
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15 Each decile represents 10 per cent of the workforce ordered by the average compensation
paid to an occupation-industry cell, e.g. managers in financial services. The deciles are
constructed using pay at the beginning of the period being studied, a year in the 1970s,
although the authors state that because the wage hierarchy remains relatively stable it does
not matter if wages at the end of the period are used.
16 Measurable data on skills are notoriously poorly defined (Bechtel, 2007; Scholz, 2007), the
only widely available conventional measures are time in education or level of qualification
(Glyn, 2000: 200).
17 Iversen and Wren argue that government pursuit of wage equality across industrial sectors
will necessarily result in fiscal deficit: their so-called post-industrial trilemma.
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Appendix – Assumptions for net disposable income calculations
in Table 2
The year worked corresponds to the tax year 2008/9. I have assumed that all
workers earn the minimum wage of £5.73 per hour. A full-time worker works
37.5 hours per week, 48 weeks of the year; a half-time worker works 18.75 hours
per week, 48 weeks of the year. Income tax and national insurance allowances
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and bands are for the tax year 2008/9 (HMRC, 2010). Because NI is calculated
weekly, earnings are spread evenly over 52 weeks. Council tax, included in BHC
measures, is taken to be that of the lowest band, band A, which represents
25 per cent of dwellings and therefore is most likely representative of the lowest
earning households. This is calculated as 6/9 of band D, or £915.33 (DCLG, 2008).
All households are above the income threshold, including working tax credits
(WTC), at which Council Tax Benefit has tapered to zero.
Tax credits follow 2008/9 allowances and taper according to income
thresholds in the order: working tax credits (WTC), childcare element of working
tax credits, child element of tax credits (CTC) and family element of child tax
credits (CTC) (HMRC, 2010). Childcare costs are estimated at the weekly levels
indicated in the table.
The net disposable median household income is the equivalised before
housing cost income for a couple with two children under 14, £361 per week
which equates to £18,772 per year (Adams et al., 2009: 18, table 2.3) This is net
of the variety of expenditure listed in Adams et al. (2009: 175–6). I considered it
more straightforward to do the calculations BHC rather than estimate a further
deduction for housing costs, which, given the availability of data, would have
likely been equal for numerator and denominator in the proportion of median
income calculations. Pension and student loan payments are deducted in the
median BHC income measure, but were not deducted from the earnings of
our hypothetical families due to lack of estimable data. If anything, this should
increase estimated income as a percentage of the median.
Having tried two different on-line calculators for tax credits (HM Revenue
and Customs, 2009; Working families.org.uk, 2009), which produced widely
different results with minimal breakdown of workings, I constructed my own
spreadsheet model following the assumptions listed above and HMRC’s worked
example (HMRC, 2009). As with the on-line calculators, this spreadsheet should
be viewed as an estimation of the tax credits, tax and NI payable and is available
upon request from the author.
